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Abstract 
A generous supply ofsocial securüy contributed to the dramatic rise of the ratio between the 
number of workers and those receiving government benefits in The Netherlands, from less 
than 0.5 in 1970 to over 0.8 in 1990. Using a macroeconomic simulation model which 
ïdescribes the negative spiral of extended demand for social securüy, increases in tax and 
\premium pressure and low labour participation, the cliometric analysis of this paper 
'imeasures the consequences of the autonomous 'supply effect' of social securüy on economie 
factivüy and labour market development. Due to the negative spiral the multiplier effect of the 
'igenerous supply of social securüy appears to be much larger than its direct effect. A 
\sensitivity analysis shows to what extent this conclusion depends upon the parameter values 
of the simulation model. 
1. Introduction 
Today's economie policy debate in The Netherlands focuses on the low labour participation 
of which the affiuent social security is considered as a major cause. The statistic indicating 
the ratio between the number of people receiving benefits and the number of active workers 
is at the core of the discussion. Table 1 shows this statistic for 1970 and for 1992. It 
demonstrates that at present each active worker in The Netherlands almost completely 
supports another person who is entitled to a benefit, whereas in 1970 a person entitled to a 
benefit had his or her support payed by two active workers1. 
This paper empirically investigates the consequences of the affiuent social security for labour 
,. participation and economie activity in The Netherlands, using a macro-economie simulation 
model according to which social security is not only determined by demand, but also partly 
. by supply. The 'supply effect' is investigated by means of a cliometric simulation over the 
period 1970-1990. This period witnessed a sharp rise in the number of persons who were (or 
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 These data refer to labour years: as the number of part time workers increased 
considerably during the last decade, the trend looks somewhat less dramatic when employ-
ment is measured in persons. 
1 
made themselves) entitled for benefits, in spite of the fact that the system of social security 
which was mainly built up in The Netherlands in the 1950's and 1960's, was not expanded 
with major new provisions in the 1970's and 1980's. 
Table 1 Keynote figures on labour participation in The Netherlands 
Inactive persons (ree. benefits) 
as % of active persons 
Earners publ. sector as % 
earners market sector 
Government expenditure as % 
of national income (data used in 
actual policy analysis in parentheses) 
Wedge as % of gross wage costs 
1970 1992 
47 84 
76 140 
33 52 
(49) (63) (73 in 1983) 
39 61 
This increase in entitlement of (existing) social security provisions is part of a mechanism 
jwhich is sometimes referred to as the social security trap (see Van Praag and Van Beek, 
W1991). According to this mechanism, the demand for social security is trapped into a 
'negative spiral and diverges further and further from equüibrium. The simulation model of 
the paper makes this negative spiral explicit by describing the relationships between social 
security, the labour market and economie activity. An expanding public sector is a major 
consequence of this negative spiral. Against this background Table 1 also gives the break-
down of the number of people receiving income from the public sector and from the market 
sector. This statistic played an important role in the policy discussions in the 1980's on the 
relative size of the public sector as compared to that of the market sector. The growth of the 
public sector and its consequences are also illustrated by the data of the lower Unes of table 
1 on the share of public expenditure in national income and the size of the wedge (gross 
wage costs minus net wage income as a percentage of gross earned wages). According to the 
latter statistics the relative size of the public sector appears to have increased with approxi-
mately 20 %-points during the last two decades.2 
J h e next section discusses the simulation model and the selection of its parameters. The 
major behaviourial part of the model describes the allocation of the working age population 
2
 The data on the share of public expenditure are based on the data sources used in our 
simulation model and do not comprise, amongst other things, local authorities public 
expenditure. Therefore our numbers are somewhat lower than those of the policy dis-
cussions. 
2 
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(Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen) pp. 14-19. 
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part Labour participation rate 
partg^ Average labour participation rate over the reference period 
S ^ Direct supply effect of social security with respect to active workers 
S,^ Direct supply effect of social security with respect to recipients of benefits 
S,^, Direct supply effect of social security with respect to non-participants without a 
benefit 
t./(t»+t,) Share of workers' tax and premium burden in total wedge 
uv Replacement ratio 
vr Trend of female participation rate 
wed Wedge between gross wage costs and net wages 
wed. Tax and premium burden for workers 
y National income (constant prices) 
y^ Idem, at average participation rate (determined exogenously) 
TCX Ratio of population under 15 which obtains working age 
ir2 Ratio of working age population of those who leave the working age population 
(by deceases, net emigration) 
7r3 Ratio of working age population of those who become eligible for an old age or 
widow's pension 
x 4 Ratio of number of persons eligible for an old age or widow's pension and of 
the number of persons leaving this category (by deceases, net emigration, 
remarrying) 
T Indirect tax rate 
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supply effect of social security show that a redress of the eligibility for social security may, 
through multiplier effects, have a substantial positive impact on labour participation. 
Symbols 
ap Trend of labour productivity (autonomous) 
Av Determinants of labour demand besides labour costs 
B„», Number of persons eligible for basic old age and widows and orphans pensions 
^ Working age population (aged 15-65) 
Bj Population under 15 
Bm Number of workers in the market sector 
B„ Number of workers in public sector (civil servants) and in social security offices 
B w Remainder of working age non-participants eligible for benefïts 
BK Number of workers in semi-public sector 
B ^ Number of persons eligible for an early retirement benefit 
Bu Number of unemployed with an unemployment benefit 
B ü Total number of working age non-participants eligible for benefits 
B ^ Number of persons eligible for benefits under the Work Disablement Act 
(WAO) 
B, Number of persons receiving benefits because of temporary illness 
B ^ Number of working age non-participants not eligible for social security benefits 
ft0 Financial deficit of the government (constant prices) 
g ^ Government expenditure on basic old age and widows and orphans pensions 
(constant prices) 
g ^ Other (autonomous) government expenditure (constant prices) 
g,^ Salaries of civil servants and workers in semi-public sector (constant prices) 
g,,; Total government expenditure on benefits for working age non-participants 
(constant prices) 
h Index contractual labour time 
1 ^ Benefit level for basic old age and widows and orphans pensions 
lb Gross real labour costs per worker in the market sector 
lb ' Idem corrected for labour productivity 
ln Net real wages in the market sector 
1„ Level of salaries of civil servants and workers in the semi-public sector at 
constant prices 
lua, Average level of gross benefits to the working age population at constant prices 
1^ Average level of net benefits to the working age population at constant prices 
op,^ Other government income (constant prices) 
op^ Government income from wage and income taxes, and from social security 
premiums (constant prices) 
op„ Government income from other taxes (constant prices) 
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4.4 Elasticity of replacement ratio 
I 
OUT final sensitivity analysis investigates how the working of the model is affected when the 
elasticity of the replacement ratio is set equal to -0.4 instead of -0.2 in the allocation model. 
For the interpretation of the results (version E of table 6) it should be noted that the 
replacement ratio witnessed a fall during (the end of) the simulation period. A higher 
sensitivity to this ratio would therefore have encouraged more people to become active 
workers so that the allocation model further overestimates the share of active workers in that 
case. Like in the case of the higher wage elasticity, both the direct supply effect of social 
security and the multiplier effect are larger than according to the basic version of the model. 
Whereas the multiplier effect is especially sizable with respect to non-participants without 
benefits in the case of high wage elasticity of labour demand, in this case of a high 
sensitivity for the replacement ratio, it is markedly the demand for social security which 
would have been much smaller if the supply effect had remained at its 1970 level. 
5 Conclusion 
• 
This paper finds its inspiration in the observation that the generous and extended social 
security system in The Netherlands may have become an obstacle for welfare by decreasing 
labour participation and economie activity. The cliometric simulations clearly indicate that 
the rise in the wedge and the increase in eligibility for social security benefits (reflected by 
the enhanced 'supply effect' of social security) have significantly contributed to the labour 
market distortions in The Netherlands during the last decades. 
This is, however, only one side of the picture. An extension of social security may also 
enhance welfare by offering protection against financial risks to more people and by 
increasing equality. One can speak about a trade-off in social security between efficiency on 
the one hand and income redistribution and risk reduction on the other. Vijlbrief (1992) has 
empirically illustrated this trade-off by 'output possibilities curves', which show a negative 
relation between the (relative) benefit level and output. L " ^ 
Yet, the current level of social security in The Netherlands is most probably not in accord-
ance with policy preferences and there is a broad consensus that the demand for social 
security should be reduced. Dutch policy plans to reduce this demand for social security 
diverge with regard to the instruments to be used. Some proposals imply price policies, i.e., 
a reduction of the benefit level, whereas others recommend volume policies, which seek to 
decrease the number of people eligible for benefits directly. The simulation results of this 
paper indicate that both policies can be effective in increasing economie activity and labour 
participation, provided that there is symmetry between the negative spiral in the past and the 
desired reversal of this spiral in the near future. This symmetry is more likely for price 
policies than for volume policies. However, the cliometric simulations with respect to the 
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The wage elasticity of labour supply is included in the 'wedge' variable in the allocation 
model. The results of version D of table 6 show that the model is not much sensitive to 
changes of this elasticity value. Now the direct, and hence the multiplier effect of social 
security supply diminish somewhat as compared to the results according to the basic version 
of the model. That is because a larger 'wedge' effect would have resulted in a higher 
discouragement of labour supply during the reference period in which the wedge increased 
substantially. In this case the overestimation of the share of active workers by the allocation 
model is somewhat less pronounced than according to the basic version of the model so that 
the residual, representing the direct supply effect, becomes slightly smaller. 
Table 6 Results of sensitivity analysis (deviations from realisations in case supply 
of social security remained constant at 1970 level) 
1990-values 
Supply effect on active workers 
(x 1000 labour years) 
Direct effect 
Multiplier effect 
Supply effect on recipients of benefits 
(x 1000 labour years) 
Direct effect 
Multiplier effect 
Supply effect on non-participants without 
benefits (x 1000 labour years) 
Direct effect 
Multiplier effect 
B 
-261 -261 -384 -172 -317 
-1166 -645 -1583 -1132 -1545 
271 271 300 249 326 
776 611 887 767 1048 
-10 -10 85 -78 -10 
389 34 695 364 497 
Economie activity (%) 
Inactive/active ratio (%-p) 
11.8 0 15.7 11.4 15.4 
30.0 -20.2 -35.4 -29.5 -37.7 
Explanatory note: A: Basic version of model 
B: No participation effect at goods market 
C: Wage elasticity of labour demand: -1 
D: 'Wedge' elasticity of labour supply: 0.4 
E: Elasticity of replacement ratio: -0.4 
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of interest as a volume policy which had aimed at keeping the supply effect at its 1970 level. 
It indicates that we should consider price and volume policies as close substitutes although 
the mechanisms at work are initially quite different. 
4 Sensitivitv analvsis 
The empirical implementation of the simulation model of this paper warrants a sensitivity 
analysis in order to investigate to what extent the results of the cliometric simulations are 
influenced by the selection of the major parameter values. This section considers alternative 
versions of the model with no participation effect on demand at the goods market, and with 
doubling of 3 major coefficients of the allocation model. The results are listed in table 6. 
4.1 Participation effect on goods market 
As mentioned before, no much empirical evidence exists on the effects of enhanced labour 
participation on economie activity. In model version B (table 6) the value of the coëfficiënt 
7, which represents this supply effect at the goods market, is set equal to zero, so that 
income is completely demand determined and exogenous to the model. The simulation 
results show that the model is quite sensitive to the size of the participation effect. The 
multiplier effect with respect to active workers appears to be substantially reduced as 
compared to that of the basic version of the model. This is mainly due to the supply effect 
on non-participants without benefits: the encouragement for non-participants to enter the 
labour market is much larger in case of a positive participation effect at the goods market 
than in the case that such participation effect does not exist. 
4.2 Wage elasticity of labour demand 
In model version C the wage elasticity of labour demand in the allocation model is changed 
from -0.5 to -1.0. Whereas the previous specification change of the model does not alter the 
measured direct supply effect of social security, this effect is enhanced according to version 
C as compared to the basic version of the model, because on average the reference period 
has been a period of wage moderation. This implies that labour demand is higher according 
to version C with a large demand elasticity than according to the basic version. Therefore, 
the (negative) residual between the calculated and the actual share of active workers has 
become larger. In other words, the allocation model overestimates the share of active 
workers still further. The larger direct supply effect of social security causes the multiplier 
effect, according to this version of the model, to be likewise larger than according to the 
basic version. 
4.3 Wage elasticity of labour supply 
17 
3.2 Constant wedge 
Table 5 shows how the Dutch economy would have developed from 1970 onwards, if the 
expenditures on social security (relative to real national income) had been constant. This 
simulation tries to visualise the idea politieians had on the future costs of social security at 
the start of the consolidation stage of the system of social security at the beginning of 
1970's. How would economie development have looked like if, at that time, not the benefit 
level, but the costs of social security had been hold constant? In order to simulate this 
budgeting of social security, we have respecified the model in such a manner that no longer 
expenditures on social security determine the wedge, but that, given the wedge, a fixed 
amount is available for social security expenditures. It implies that an increase in the number 
of persons eligible for benefits leads, ceteris paribus, to a reduction in the benefit level. The 
results of table 5 give the difference between the dynamic simulation of the past in which the 
value of the wedge is equal to its actual value (baseline projection, which again reproduces 
the historical past) and a dynamic simulation (alternative projection) in which the wedge is 
kept constant. 
Table 5 Indicators for the relative size of the public sector in the case of a wedge 
held constant at the level of 1970 (deviations from baseline projection) 
1975 1980 1985 1990 
Economie activity % 4.5 6.6 13.1 12.3 
Employment % 9.1 13.5 28.0 26.1 
Government expenditure as a percentage %-p ^ .8 -6.8 -8.9 -9.6 
of national income 
Size of wedge (as a percentage of gross %-p -8.4 -12.2 -20.3 -20.4 
wage costs) 
Earners in the public sector as a percen- %-p -17.7 -25.8 -54.5 -52.0 
tage of earners in the private sector 
Inactive persons as a percentage of active %-p -11.0 -14.9 -30.9 -31.0 
persons 
Explanatory note: see table 3. 
Table 5 shows that the actual increase of the wedge and the induced discouragement to 
participate in the labour market has had a rather large negative effect on economie activity 
and employment. A comparison of the results of tables 3 and 5 reveals Üiat a policy of 
budgeting of social security would have had about the same effect on the economie variables 
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but also some of those who nowadays receive benefits as 'disabled', and even some of those 
who are now non-participants without a benefit because they are discouraged to enter the 
labour market due to the high level of the wedge. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1. Besides the actual shares and the supply effect this figure also 
pictures the shares of active workers, recipients of benefits and non-participants without 
benefits according to the cliometric simulation with the supply effect of social security at its 
1970 level. The difference between this hypothetical share and the actual share can be 
regarded as the multiplier effect of the supply of social security. Due to the spiral mechan-
ism of a high tax and premium burden and low labour participation, this multiplier effect 
appears to be much larger than the direct supply effect. The upper diagram of Figure 1 
shows that the share of recipients of benefits would, because of the worsened situation at the 
labour market, also have increased in the 1970's in case of no supply effect of social 
security. However, this increase would have been much smaller than it has actually been. 
Today, the share of the recipients of benefits would, without the multiplier supply effect, be 
more than 8%-points lower than it actually is. This amounts to almost 800.000 labour years 
(see also table 4). The second diagram of figure 1 illustrates that without the multiplier 
effect the share of active workers, and thus labour participation, would have stopped falling 
after the mid of the 1970's. Here the multiplier effect amounts to more than one million full 
time workers at the end of the simulation period. The lower diagram of Figure 1 confirms 
that a less generous social security would also have induced a considerable number of non-
participants without benefits to labour participation. This is a remarkable result because, as 
mentioned before, the direct supply effect on this category is almost nil. 
Table 4 Direct and multiplier effects of supply of social security (1000 labour 
years). 
Recipients of benefits 
Direct effect 
Multiplier effect 
Active workers 
Direct effect 
Multiplier effect 
Non-participants without a benefit 
Direct effect 
Multiplier effect 
1975 1980 1985 1990 
99 47 256 271 
131 249 709 776 
-55 -77 -303 -261 
-140 -450 -1207 -1166 
-44 30 47 -10 
9 201 498 389 
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3. Cliometric simulations 
This section presents the results of two cliometric simulations. .Such simulations show how 
economie development in the past would have looked like, if some events would have 
occurred that in fact did not occur (or if some events would not have occurred mat in fact 
did occur). 
3.1 Supply effect at 1970 level 
The first cliometric simulation has the supply effect of social security held constant at its 
1970 value. This simulation pictures the situation that social security would not have become 
increasingly genereus in the last decades. Table 3 gives the differences between this 
cliometric simulation and the baseline projection. The baseline projection reproduces actual 
developments because the supply effect is set equal to the residual of the allocation model in 
this projection. 
Table 3 Indicators for the relative size of the public sector in the case of the 
supply effect of social security had remained at its 1970 level (deviations 
from baseline projection) 
1975 1980 1985 1990 
Economie activity % 1.6 4.9 13.1 11.8 
Employment % 3.2 10.1 27.9 24.9 
Government expenditure as a percentage 
of national income 
%-p -1.9 -4.3 -9.4 -9.2 
Size of wedge (as a percentage of gross 
wage costs) 
%-p -3.3 -8.3 -21.2 -19.5 
Earners in the public sector as a percen-
tage of earners in the private sector 
%-p -7.5 -19.8 -54.9 -50.4 
Inactive persons as a percentage of active 
persons 
%-p -4.7 -11.3 -31.2 -30.0 
Explanatory note: % percentage difference from baseline projection 
%-p percentage-points difference from baseline projection 
The table shows that in case social security would not have been increasingly genereus 
economie development would have been much more favourable. The 'inactive ratio' would 
be 30%-points lower in the cliometric simulation as compared to its actual value and this 
higher labour participation would have resulted in almost 25%-points more employment in 
the market sector. These additional active workers do not only comprise today's unemployed 
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market with labour participation at its average rate (ym which is exogenous in the model), 
and the induced labour participation effect. 
y = y« (part /part^ (20) 
with part = (Bm + B0 + BJ / B„ (21) 
and partgem the average participation rate over the reference period 
Now the coëfficiënt 7, indicating the labour participation effect on economie activity, should 
be given a plausible value. We have set y equal to 0.5: a dynamic simulation over the 
reference period shows that, given the actual decrease of labour participation, the effect 
according to this coëfficiënt value over the reference period has been about 10% of national 
income. In section 4 this coëfficiënt value will be subject to a sensitivity analysis. 
Of course, the present version of the model highly simplifies the actual social security 
system of The Netherlands as it adds together different social security provisions (disability, 
sickness, unemployment, early retirement and social assistance). Thus, the benefit level is 
calculated as the average level of benefits under these provisions. No simulations can be 
made on the dynamics of the allocation within these various provisions. Therefore, a 
possible extension of the model would be to add a second allocation model which describes 
the desaggregation of the non-participants reeeiving a benefit to the various provisions of 
social security. This is of importance in the context of actual policy discussions in The 
Netherlands, because a number of recipients of benefits under the disablement act should in 
fact be regarded as unemployed. However, as this paper only aims to demonstrate the 
working of the main mechanisms, we did not yet include such a nested allocation model4. 
When the supply effect of social security is described by a simple dummy-trend with 
estimated coefficients, a dynamic simulation over the reference period shows that the model 
is quite capable to describe the past, given the selected parameter values3. Moreover, a joint 
estimation of all parameters of the allocation model does not lead to a rejection from a 
statistical point of view of the parameter values selected by us. 
4
 Another feasible extension of the model would be to allow for a differentiated 
influence of the tax pressure (marginal versus average tax rates, taxes paid by employers 
versus employees) on the allocation mechanism. The Central Planning Bureau (1992) uses 
the MIMIC-model, an applied general equilibrium model, for such simulations. 
5
 A dynamic simulation over the reference period with the residual of the allocation 
model as supply effect, of course, perfectly reproduces the realisations: this simulation is 
used as baseline in the cliometric simulations of the next sections. 
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The next set of equations of the model describes the government budget. Equations (12), 
(13) and (14) determine government expenditures, namely for salades and for the payment 
of benefits. Equation (15) is a technical equation for indirect taxes. Equation (16) calculates 
desired government income from direct taxes and social security premiums as a residual of 
the budget restriction. As argued above, the model assumes that government expenditure, 
given indirect taxes and the size of the government deficit, is completely financed out of 
taxes and social security premiums. This determines the size of the wedge (equation 17). 
Equations (18) and (19) are related definitions of the wedge which are used elsewhere in the 
model. 
g«i = 1„ (B„ + BJ (12) 
gui = U B^ (13) 
opw = ry (15) 
oPbp = g«i + gui + g™ + g«* - op„ - opaut - ft„ (16) 
wed = oPbp / {lb Bm + 1„ (B„ + BJ} (17) 
wed ï =[ t . / ( t , + tq)]wed (18) 
wed,' = (1 - wedj (19) 
Changes in labour participation will bring about feedback mechanisms at the goods market. 
When more people become active in the production process economie activity will increase, 
not only because of the input of productive capacity which remains idle in the case of non-
participation, but also because the use of this productive capacity enlarges human capital by 
learning by doing, while on the other hand human capital depreciates when it remains 
unused. Consequenüy, the enhanced economie activity induces higher tax receipts of the 
government (see eq. 15). On the other hand, a rise in the number of non-participants 
receiving social security benefits leads to an increase in government expenditure. The size of 
this increase depends, among other things, on the benefit level (see eq. 13) 
Without fonnally modelling the goods market, equations (20) and (21) describe, in a very 
broad marmer, the positive effect of an increase in labour participation on economie activity, 
due to enhanced productive capacity. Until now, not much empirical work has been done on 
measuring welfare gains from enhanced labour participation empirically (see Bastianen et 
al., 1993), so that our modelling of this effect is, by necessity, somewhat surmised. 
Equation (20) describes actual income as the combined result of the demand on the goods 
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4 5 * 
44K 
43K 
43% 
41% 
AOt 
38M 
3GK 
• actual share shaded area: supply effect 
A share according to cliometric simulation without supply effect 
Gross real wage costs, salaries of civil servants and the level of benefits (both to non-
participants who belong to the working age population and to old age pensioners) are 
considered autonomous in the basic version of the model. It implies that the wage formation 
process is left out of consideration in the cliometric analysis, so that differences in labour 
participation, in tax and premium pressure and in the stance of the goods market do not 
affect gross wages in the 'what if simulation (but, of course net wages are affected). Hence 
the interpretation of the results of the cliometric analysis is conditional on this specific 
ceteris paribus assumption. The alternative would have been a fully fledged modelling of the 
wage-price spiral, which is impossible as the model does not endogenise utilization rates3. 
The government budget confronts government expenditure with income from taxes and 
social security premiums. When expenditures rise, for instance because of an increase in the 
number of people receiving benefits, higher expenditures can be financed in two ways, 
namely by enlarging the government deficit or by an increase in the wedge between gross 
wage costs and net wages. An increase in the government deficit is not feasible in the 
present economie and political situation in The Netheflands. That is why a rise in the 
demand for social security nowadays almost automatically implies that the wedge between 
net wages and gross wage costs becomes larger. Moreover, this endogeneity of the wedge is 
also institutionally determined as social funds are financed on a balanced budget basis. 
3
 The inclusion of a conventional wage equation into the model would anyhow be 
questionable as unemployment does not seem to be an adequate indicator of labour market 
pressure in this context. 
-participants without a benefit 
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Figure 1 Labour partidpation and the supply effect of sodal security (share in % 
of working age population excl. of civil servants and workers in the semi-
public sector). 
Recipients of a benefit 
Active workers 
10 
Table 2 Parameter values of the allocation model 
expl. variable j = 0jm 0jui 
1 A, 0.41 -0.10 
2 V -4.0 10* 1.0 10^ 
3 wed.' 0.065 -0.016 
4uv -5.0 IQ4 5.0 10"4 
5vr 0.0013 0.0013 
Explanatory note: parameter values do not exactly suffice the restrictions due to 
rounding errors 
Figure 1 illustrates the development of the shares described by the allocation model up to 
1992. The figure pictures the opposite developments of the share of active workers in the 
market sector and of recipients of a benefit. The share of non-participants not receiving a 
benefit did increase somewhat in the 1970's, but in the 1980's this share has decreased. 
The shaded area in Figure 1 represents the supply effect calculated as the residual of the 
allocation model. The upper diagram shows that the supply effect for the recipients of 
benefit was rather small in the 1970's and amounted to less than 1% of the working age 
population, i.e. less than 100.000 labour years (see also table 3). During the 1980's the 
supply effect increased to 3% of the working age population. According to the second 
diagram of Figure 1 the supply effect for the active workers appears to be almost the mirror 
image of that for the recipients of benefits. It implies, as shown in the third diagram of 
Figure 1, that the supply effect is almost nil for non-participants without a benefit. 
2.4 Rest of the model 
The rest of the model, which describes the relationship between the government budget, 
labour participation and the goods market, is kept a simple as possible. Equations (9) and 
(10) describe technical relationships between the wedge, gross wage costs and net wages. 
1B = 1„ (1 - wed) (9) 
U = U wed.' (10) 
Equation (11) defines the replacement ratio: 
u v ^ / 1 . (11) 
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total (corrected) working age population adapt to their desired shares according to a partial 
adjustment with a mean lag of one year. 
Next we have selected parameter values for the determinants with respect to labour demand. 
We assume that on the long term a one percent increase in economie activity (corrected for 
labour saving technical progress and working hours) leads to an equal increase of one 
percent in the number of active workers in the market sector. Hence, the long term elasticity 
is set to unity. This increase in the number of active workers is supposed to stem from both 
other categories proportionally. 
The long run labour demand elasticity of labour costs is set equal to -0.5 (see Den Butter, 
1993a, for a survey of empirical evidence for The Netherlands). Again the assumption is 
made of a proportional distribution over both other categories. 
Empirical studies of the influence of the wedge, or net wages, on labour supply indicate a 
long term elasticity of 0.2 (see e.g. Theeuwes, 1988). The parameter value of the wedge in 
the fïrst equation of the allocation model is set in accordance to this elasticity. Here the 
wedge is defined as the burden of taxes and premiums for workers (the burden for 
employers is included in the labour costs). Again a proportional distribution over both other 
categories is assumed. 
We assume that the long run labour supply elasticity of the benefit wage ratio is rather 
small, namely -0.2. We have modelled the influence of the replacement ratio in the alloca-
tion model in such a manner that a rise in this ratio only induces a shift in the shares of 
active workers and non-participants receiving a benefit. We do so because there is no 
evidence on a possible influence of changes in the replacement ratio on the allocation of 
non-participants between those receiving benefits and those not receiving benefits. If these 
latter changes in allocation would take place it would, by the way, imply a direct form of 
rent seeking behaviour: it would suggest that if benefit levels go up, more people seek 
eligibility for benefits without the intention to participate as active worker. 
Increased participation of women is equally distributed over workers in the market sector 
and non-participants receiving benefits. The parameter values of the allocation model are 
calculated in such a manner that they are, in the mean of the reference period, in accordance 
with the chosen values of the long term elasticities. The respective values are given in table 
2. 
After these parameter values were established, the constant terms of the allocation model 
(which should add up to 0.5 because of the distributed lag) have been determined by means 
of regression analysis. Finally the residuals of the allocation model representing the supply 
effect of social security are calculated and normalised to 1970 = 0. 
8 
The wedge as a measure of the tax and premium burden for employees is the third determi-
nant of the allocation model. This determinant is connected with labour supply and it 
combines the arguments on rewards and opportunity costs when the individual supplier of 
labour has to choose between being in SlF Sj or S3. An increase in the wedge is associated 
with the discouragement of labour supply and, hence, with an increase in non-participation, 
so that both the share of the non-participants receiving a benefit and that of those who do 
not receive a benefit increases. Therefore the increased size of the wedge is an element of 
major concern in the policy discussions on low labour participation and the social security 
trap. 
The wage benefit ratio or replacement ratio is the fourth determinant and acts as argument in 
U(Sj). A rise in the benefit level also leads to less labour supply. In this case, substitution 
within the allocation model mainly takes place between active workers and non-participants 
receiving a benefit. Moreover, for technical reasons, we have included labour participation 
of women as a determinant of the allocation. An increase of female labour participation 
(which, by the way, is rather low in The Netherlands as compared to other Western 
industrialised countries) leads to a higher share of both the active workers and non-partici-
pants receiving a benefit. 
Finally the supply effect of social security is taken as the residual of the allocation model. 
The previous characterisation of the supply effect indicated that this representation of the 
social climate has a variety of underlying causes which are difficult to quantify, so that it is 
not tried to describe the supply effect by specific detenninants. Yet, the supply effect is 
assumed to have a positive influence on the share of the recipients of benefits and have a 
negative effect on the share of active workers. The empirical implementation of the 
allocation model shows this to hold true so that the residual of the model may indeed be 
regarded as the supply effect. 
2.3 Selection of parameter values 
Now we need realistic values for the parameters of the allocation model, which represent 
economie hehaviour. Our selected parameter values for the allocation model are not based 
upon own empirical research, but mainly reproduce results from the literature. In this way, 
we conform ourselves as much as possible to the existing stock of empirical knowledge. 
Moreover, our specification of the supply effect prevents a full econometrie estimation of all 
parameters of the model. Yet, the description of labour participation by means of an 
allocation model is a novelty of our approach and, therefore, we are bound to make a 
number of assumptions on the distribution of the effects over the three categories we 
distinguish. 
The simulation model uses annuai data from the reference period 1970-1990. Firstly, the 
allocation model assumes that the actual shares of the three distinguished categories of the 
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E*,», - B.^ _j + fl-jB,, _j - i^B.^ _j (2) 
The allocation model is given by equations (4 to 6). The quantity to be allocated to the three 
categories is total working age population minus civil servants and workers in the so-called 
semi-public sector (eq. 3). Thus, we assume that employment in the public sector is 
autonomously determined by the govemment and does not influenee labour participation of 
the rest of the working age population. 
Bk' = B b -B 0 -B K (3) 
B./Bfc* = 0.5 (BJB/).! + &„ + fc.A, + ftj/ + ft_wed.* + /?4muv + 
&»vr + S.^ (4) 
B ^ B / * 0.5 (B„/Bb,).1 + ^ + /3laiAv + ftjV + ftdwed,^ /S^uv + 
0*vr + S ^ (5) 
B./Bfc'* 0.5 (BJBfc*)^ +180™+ AnA + &J,,' + ftÉ.wed.*+ A J I V + 
&»vr + S „ (6) 
with parameter restrictions 
E/3ax = 0.5, x = m, ui, zu 
S ^ = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; x = m, ui, zu 
and with Sm + S ^ + S*» = 0 
The first determinant of the allocation model relates to the non-wage aspects of labour 
demand, which is mainly determined by economie activity corrected for labour saving 
technical progress (trend of labour productivity). Contractual working time is also relevant 
in this respect (eq. 7). 
Av = {(y/ap) (1 + 0.5(1004))} / B,' (7) 
An increase in employment opportunities, indicated by this labour demand variable, leads to 
a larger share of active workers in the market sector and, consequently, to a decrease in the 
share of non-participants. Real wage costs, corrected for structural increases in productivity 
(eq. 8), act as second determinant of employment opportunities and have an opposite effect. 
A rise in wage costs induces labour demand to fall and the share of non-participants to rise. 
V = V(ap/ap1969) (8) 
6 
to effectuate such decrease is to call for the responsibility of the people not to abuse social 
security, and to provide training and the opportunity to obtain working experience rather 
than just giving financial compensation ('workfare' instead of 'welfare'). In The Netherlands 
this kind of policy is part of the so-called 'social renewal'. Obviously these underlying 
determinants to redress the supply effect are very uncertain and difficult to quantify. 
The (dis)utility of receiving a benefit, U2, is taken as a separate argument in the utility 
function above, but of course this (dis)utility is strongly connected with the social climate. In 
Den Butter (1993a) the variable representing the supply effect is, by way of experiment, 
endogenised by assuming that the disutility for the applicants of social security becomes 
smaller when the number of persons receiving benefits increases. As this is, of course, only 
one aspect of the supply effect, and because the supply effect is autonomous in the clio-
metric simulations of this paper, we will not pursue this line of thought any further. 
Finally we have to consider the individual of the working age population who decides to be 
non-participant without benefit. As this is the residual state we have 
U(S3) = f3 (U3) 
with U3 the (dis)utility of being in state S3. This (dis)utility depends upon the value of leisure 
time and upon the reciprocal of all arguments raised in the discussion on the utility of being 
in states St and S2, so that this (dis)utility can be normalised to U3 = 0. 
Now each individual potential supplier of labour is faced with the following simple discrete 
choice problem: 
max { U(S0, UCS,), U(S3)} j = 1, 2, 3 
On the aggregate this discrete choice problem boils down to an allocation model for the 
working age population with the arguments of the above utility functions as determinants. 
The next two subsections report on the empirical implementation of the allocation model and 
of the supply effect of social security at the macro level. 
2.2 Specification of allocation model 
Equations (1) and (2) describe the size of the working age population and the number of 
people receiving benefits from old age (AOW) and widows and orphans pensions (AWW). 
Both dependent variables are determined by demographic factors. 
B„ = B„
 4 + TlB, _j - x A . r *& _! (1) 
5 
The utility of being an active worker firstly depends, as in textbook labour supply models, 
on net earned wages, 1„ (see the Appendix for a glossary of symbols). Secondly there are 
costs involved in finding and holding a job, which are dependent upon the ease with which 
jobs can be obtained and hence upon labour demand. Therefore two determinants of labour 
demand enter into the utility function, namely gross real labour cost per worker in the 
market sector, corrected for labour productivity, lk', and economie activity corrected for 
labour saving technical progress and contractual working hours, Av. 
U(Si) = fx fc, V, A,, ü t) 
Finally there is a (dis)utility Ut connected with being an active worker, which on the one 
hand can be associated with foregone leisure time, but on the other hand also with opportun-
ities for social contacts, for maintenance and upgrading of human capital (Tearning by 
doing') or even for future eligibility for social security (albeit that the model does not 
explicitly account for such dynamic strategie behaviour). 
The utility of being a recipiënt of a benefit is assumed to be a function of the replacement 
ratio, uv, (the ratio of net benefits and net earned wages), the ease with which social 
security benefits can be obtained, SK, and the (dis)utility of receiving a benefit, U2. 
U(S2) = f2(uv,SiC,U2) 
The replacement ratio as an argument in this utility function is in accordance with^  labour 
supply models of the literature (see Vijlbrief, 1992). The benefit level may also let as an 
argument in the utility function for the active workers representing the reservation wage. 
The second argument, the ease (or costs) of obtaining a benefit, relates to the main theme of 
this paper: the supply effect. Like in public health services (see Bikker and De Vos, 1992), 
the number of people obtaining a social security benefit does not solely depend upon the 
underlying determinants of demand, but also upon supply. We may label this the 'social 
climate' for social security. 
A fust aspect with regard to the supply effect is the well known moral hazard problem with 
social security. Lubbers (1990) describes this change of the social climate as the erosion of 
the sense of responsibility when applying for social security. On the other hand, the supply 
effect comprises the fact that people will become aware of their legal right to demand social 
security in case they have become eligible. For that reason we use the wording of social 
climate which does not contain a value judgement. One could also speak of a kind of 
increased 'rent seeking', which is yet another aspect of the supply effect. Whereas the 
benefit level as an instrument of the govemment represents so-called price poïicies in social 
security, the various possibilities of the govemment to influence the supply of social security 
can be regarded as examples of volume poïicies. A decrease of the supply effect can be 
brought about by strengthening the standards of eligibility for social security. Another way 
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over active workers, recipients of benefits and non-participants without benefits. The supply 
effect of social security is calculated as the residual of this allocation model. The first 
cliometric simulation of section 3 shows how labour participation and economie activity 
would have developed if this supply of social security had remained at its 1970 level. 
Aecording to this simulation the multiplier effect of the supply öf social security, induced by 
the negative spiral of the social security trap, appears to be much larger than the direct 
effect, viz. the residuals of the allocation model. Section 3 also considers a cliometric 
simulation which has the benefit accommodated in such a way that the wedge would have 
remained constant at its 1970 level. The sensitivity analysis of section 4 investigates to what 
extent the measured size of the supply effect is influenced by our selection of the parameter 
values of the simulation model. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model 
2.1 Theoretical background 
The model describes a breakdown of the total working age population into three categories, 
namely the active workers - participants in the terminology of the policy discussions -, non-
participants receiving a benefit, and finally non-participants who do not receive a benefit. 
The second category includes recipients of a benefit in virtue of occupational disability 
(WAO), temporarily illness, unemployment, early retirement (VUT), and public assistance, 
incl. attist-arrangements, etc. However, it excludes the recipients of old age pensions and of 
benefits aecording to the Widows and Orphans Act (AOW and AWW) as these recipients of 
benefits do not belong, or are not counted as to belong, to the working age population. We 
note that the first two keynote figures of Table 1 include these old age pensioners and 
widows as inactive persons receiving benefits. Besides unemployment, which increased from 
82.000 labour years in 1970 to 502.000 labour years in 1992, the major source of the boost 
in the number of people eligible for a benefit has been occupational disability. This increase 
of 188.000 in 1970 to 715.000 in 1992 is considered to be partly unemployment in disguise. 
The model assumes that the allocation of the working age population to the three categories 
is determined by labour supply behaviour. Each individual of the working age population 
has the discrete choice to be in one of the three states: 
St: Active worker 
S2: Recipiënt of benefits 
S3: Non-participant without benefits 
Each state is associated with a certain amount of utility which is partly a fünction of 
monetary rewards and monetary costs (including opportunity costs) and which partly relates 
to immaterial aspects of being in that state. 
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